examples can be found in research related to the health effects of tobacco (Barnes and Bero 1997, 1998) and the safety and efficacy of pharma ceuti cals (Bero et al. 2007; Lexchin et al. 2003 ) and medical procedures (Popelut et al. 2010; Shah et al. 2005) . These and other empirical findings (Bero 1999) demon strate that an industry's financial stake is unlikely to be mitigated by applying a 10-point "credibility score" such as the one proposed by Conrad and Becker. Conrad and Becker (2011) Individually and together, Conrad and Becker's 10 criteria do not have the capacity to mitigate funding bias. Their criteria are a mixture of minimal meas ures of scientific integrity (full disclosure, independence of principal investigators, prohibiting ghost writing, peer review); strongly contested judgments related to the superiority of study designs [Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) versus non-GLP studies]; and practices that lack the capacity to reduce bias unless they are wedded to mechanisms for transparent, unconflicted enforcement and accountability (registries and organizational existence of an external review policy). Although their scoring system admirably requires disclosure, their criteria standards explicitly ignored what is disclosed as a potential source of bias when evaluating the quality of a study. Moreover, disclosure does not itself eliminate bias (Bero 1999) .
There is an inherent conflict in the source documents from which Conrad and Becker (2011) Agencies and scientific advisory committees should consider sources of funding and any conflicts of interest as they review the reasons why a study may have been undertaken, the way a study was framed and carried out, and how the study results have been interpreted and discussed. (Bipartisan Policy Center 2009) IARC (2008) precludes research funding from commissioning parties that "develop activities or sustain principles that are contrary to IARC missions, e.g., the tobacco industry"; and FASEB (the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology) lists as a guiding principle that "investigators shall regard all significant financial interests in research regarding human subjects as potentially problematic and thus requiring close scrutiny" (Brockway and Furcht 2006) . A closer read of the source documents is inconsistent with Conrad and Becker's attribution of an "emerging consensus" on this issue.
We are not suggesting that industryfunded science should a priori be excluded from the evidence informing chemical policy. We are proposing that based on the evidence from the clinical sciences, an important pathway to addressing funding bias is through the application of systema tic and transparent methodologies to vet the science, including explicit recognition of the potential bias introduced by funding source (Guyatt et al. 2008; Higgins and Green 2006; Woodruff et al. 2011 ) Importantly, although essential to addressing bias, systematic and transparent methods still do not guarantee that the influence of industry funding will be eliminated (Rennie 2010; Roseman et al. 2011) Ultimately, the only legitimate pathway to achieve public confidence about chemical safety is to institute and sustain a proactive, robust regulatory system that is responsive to the needs of individuals, workers, and communities whose health is impacted by exposure to chemicals (Landrigan and Goldman 2011; Vogel and Roberts 2011) . Advances in chemical policy must be inextricably linked to the develop ment and support for independent mechanisms to generate the science, systematic and transparent reviews 
